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On the Performance of KiwiSaver Funds 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This study investigates three issues: (1) the replicability of KiwiSaver Balanced (and 
other intermediate) funds based on a combination of Conservative and Growth funds 
offered by the same provider; (2) the risk-adjusted performance of the KiwiSaver 
Growth funds; (3) the market timing skill of KiwiSaver fund managers. We find that 
for the majority of fund providers, Moderate/Balanced funds are linear combinations 
of the Conservative and Growth funds with some mispricing between the fees of the 
actual fund and the reconstructed fund. We further report substantial variation in the 
amount of risk-taking, and local and international stock market exposure of 
KiwiSaver Growth funds, making it meaningless to compare these funds simply based 
on their returns. Using risk-adjusted performance metrics, we observe there is no 
evidence of systematic outperformance of KiwiSaver Growth funds, and in several 
cases there is evidence of systematic underperformance. Furthermore there is no sign 
of market timing skill by KiwiSaver fund managers.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The KiwiSaver scheme, predominantly a work-based, voluntary pension system, was 
introduced on July 1, 2007 in New Zealand. KiwiSaver is a subsidised, defined 
contribution investment scheme, with the contribution rate currently set at 6% that is 
divided equally between the employee and employer. There are further some marginal 
tax credits for employees.
1
  
 
KiwiSaver funds have come to play an important role in the New Zealand financial 
landscape in recent years. Since the scheme’s inception, investors have gradually 
realised the importance of investing in KiwiSaver. As of the middle of 2013, assets in 
KiwiSaver funds exceeded NZ$15 billion with more than 2.1 million investors. One 
of the main aims of the New Zealand government when introducing the KiwiSaver 
scheme was to increase long-term savings of the public and encourage them to 
provide for better retirement, which, to certain extent, has been met.
2
 
 
To date, there has been very limited academic research on various aspects of 
KiwiSaver pension scheme, KiwiSaver fund providers and KiwiSaver investors. The 
main reason is undeniably the young age of this particular fund industry and the lack 
of long-term data. There are, however, a couple of recent studies that examine several 
relevant issues. Thomas and Matthews (2013) investigate the determinants of fund 
                                                 
1
 Details of KiwiSaver are available at http://www.kiwisaver.govt.nz.  
 
2
 In New Zealand, there is evidence of negative savings among certain segments of society, with youth 
saving the least (Scobie and Henderson, 2009). Additionally, at the time of the introduction of 
KiwiSaver, less than 30 per cent of the active labour force was covered by some sort of retirement plan 
(Kritzer, 2007). The question of sufficient wealth accumulation and the adequacy of the current 
contribution rate have been investigated in a recent paper by MacDonald, Bianchi and Drew (2012). 
The authors, applying stochastic simulation analysis, find that the current rate of 6% is far too low to 
ensure New Zealanders to have sufficient savings in the long term.  
 
4 
 
and member flows among KiwiSaver funds. The authors find that, on average, there is 
a positive relation between performance and both types of flow. However, they also 
observe a positive relation between performance and outflow that could not be 
explained. Thomas and Matthews further find inconclusive results when investigating 
the influence of the size of fund, and number of investors, on fund flows. 
 
In another paper, Zhang (2013), using a unique proprietary data set of 405,107 
individual KiwiSaver accounts, investigates the impact that financial advice has on 
the asset allocation decision of investors. Her findings show that women, older 
investors and investors with relatively higher levels of wealth appear to obtain 
financial advice more than others. Second, those investors who receive advice hold 
riskier assets in their portfolios, less cash and bonds, and more property and equity. 
Finally, Zhang reports that differences in the performance of the two groups, advised 
and non-advised investors, is marginal over the 5 year period she examines. 
 
Academic studies on various characteristics of mutual funds, and especially their 
performance, are abundant
3
. Based on the extant literature, we can assert, in a nutshell, 
that most mutual funds underperform their respective market index (Fama and French, 
2008) and there should be no premium paid for active fund management (Malkiel, 
1995; Carhart, 1997). There is further strong evidence that fund performance 
deteriorates with fund size (Chen, Hong, Huang, and Kubik, 2004) and fees (Gil-Bazo 
and Ruiz-Verdu, 2009). There are, however, some studies that find that fund 
managers exhibit some skills. For example, there is certain evidence of short-term 
persistence in funds’ performance (Hendricks, Patel, and Zekhauser, 1993) and that 
                                                 
3
 For an exhaustive analysis of various aspects of New Zealand mutual fund performance, please see 
Bauer, et al (2006). 
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money flows to past good performers (Del Guerico and Tkac, 2002). Investors are 
also able to display some fund selection ability as they tend to invest in funds with 
successive good performance (Zheng, 1999). Although some of the issues raised in 
the above mentioned studies have been investigated in the context of KiwiSaver, to 
our knowledge,  our paper is the first to examine the performance of KiwiSaver funds.  
 
In this paper, we contribute mainly to two strands of research. First, we investigate the 
issue of replicability of funds, using KiwiSaver fund family. The question of interest 
here is to see whether we can replicate a fund that has the same level of risk and 
return as an existing fund but lower level of fees, which in turn translates into higher 
returns. Second, we investigate the risk-adjusted performance of KiwiSaver Growth 
funds as well as their mangers’ market timing skills. The sample for our analysis 
consists of all actively traded growth/equity funds over the period September 2007 – 
April 2013.
4
 We use the Fama-French (1992) and Carhart (1997) multi-factor models 
to measure risk-adjusted performance, in addition to the traditional market model. We 
further explore the exposure of these funds to New Zealand and Australian equity 
market, respectively. Based on anecdotal evidence, and we confirm this empirically, 
most New Zealand fund managers have their asset allocation concentrated in these 
two markets. In the final section of our paper, we investigate the market timing ability 
of KiwiSaver fund managers.  
 
                                                 
4
 There are not a vast variety of funds available to investors. Most fund providers offer four to five 
categories. For example, BNZ offers: Cash, Conservative, Moderate, Balanced, Growth Funds. These 
investment funds, to varying degrees based on their risk exposure, then invest in cash, domestic bonds, 
international bonds, domestic equity, international equity, and property. We have chosen to concentrate 
only on Growth or Equity funds as they should be mainly investing in equities nationally and 
internationally. The models applied in our paper are suitable for such funds and cannot be applied 
indiscriminately to other multi assets funds.   
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Our findings indicate that, for the majority of fund providers, our synthetic “moderate 
and balanced funds” are linear combinations of the conservative and growth funds 
that the KiwiSaver providers offer. We observe that investors should be able, in 
various instances, to combine the existing funds to replicate a moderate or balanced 
fund with lower transaction costs. On the whole, we find no evidence that 
equity/growth KiwiSaver funds outperform based on the various benchmark models 
we employ, and in some cases we document significant underperformance. Finally, 
the KiwiSaver fund managers do not exhibit any skills to time their respective market, 
and in some cases we report significant negative market timing skills.   
 
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 details the methodologies used in 
this paper. Section 3 describes our data and the selection of our sample. Section 4 
presents the empirical results and Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Methodology 
 
We aim to investigate the performance and behaviour of KiwiSaver funds. This 
analysis consists of three steps. First, we examine the replicability of KiwiSaver funds 
based on their Conservative and Growth strategies. Second, we examine the risk 
adjusted performance of the KiwiSaver growth funds, i.e. those that have the greatest 
exposure to equity investments. Finally, we assess market timing skills of fund 
managers.  
 
 
 
7 
 
2.1 Constrained OLS – Fund Replication 
The first step in our analysis is the examination of whether funds can be replicated 
within a particular KiwiSaver fund provider. Specifically, we address the question of 
whether, say, a Balanced fund, or Moderate fund, is a linear combination of a 
Conservative and Growth fund. To examine this issue, we rely on a constrained OLS 
methodology that allows estimation a relationship between variables, while imposing 
constraints on the coefficients that are being estimated. Specifically, we estimate the 
following model:  
 
ttgrowthtconsit rrr   ,2,1 .     (1) 
 
This regression imposes the following constraints. First, we constrain the constant in 
the regression to be zero. Second, we constrain coefficients, β1 and β2, to be greater 
than zero. Third, we add the constraint that the sum of the coefficients is equal to one 
(i.e. β1 + β2 = 1). These restrictions imply that the coefficients, β1 + β2, can essentially 
be interpreted as allocations, or weights, that need to be put on the respective 
KiwiSaver funds.  
 
To determine whether the allocations in two funds lead to a good replication of the 
fund in question (e.g., whether a Balanced fund can be constructed out of a 
Conservative and a Growth fund), we perform a second regression to assess the fit of 
the replicated fund on the actual fund. Specifically, we regress 
 
titit rr  ˆ ,              (2) 
 
8 
 
where itrˆ is the return of the replicated portfolio, and rit is the return of the actual 
portfolio. If the replicated portfolio fits the actual portfolio perfectly, then we would 
expect α = 0 and β = 1. Whether the replicated portfolio fits the actual portfolio can be 
assessed through a joint test (F-test) on α and β in Equation (2). In addition, if the 
replicated portfolio fits the actual portfolio well, we would expect a very high R
2
 for 
this regression.  
 
Note that regressions such as Equation (2) and joint test on the coefficients are 
commonly used in the financial forecasting literature, where a forecasted value is 
assessed against the actual realization, and the coefficients and R
2
 are used to assess 
the forecasting performance of the specific forecaster (see e.g. Andersen et al., 2003). 
 
2.2 Performance Analysis 
The second step in the analysis of KiwiSaver funds is to analyse the performance of 
the KiwiSaver funds. This analysis will only be conducted for Growth/Equity funds, 
as these funds invest most heavily into equity, and the performance measurement 
literature on equity funds is most developed. In first instance, we assess performance 
by comparing the performance of funds relative to the New Zealand and Australian 
stock markets, and second by examining performance in a global context. 
 
The first model we consider is a comparison of the performance of each “growth” 
fund with the NZX50 and ASX200 market indices. We run the following regression: 
 
,21 tttt ASXNZXR       (3) 
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where Rt is the return on a specific fund in excess of the risk-free rate (the 90-day 
bank bill rate), NZXt is the return on the NZX 50 index in excess of the risk-free rate, 
and ASXt is the return on the ASX 200 index (in NZ dollar) in excess of the risk-free 
rate. The coefficients β1 and β2 capture the exposures of the fund relative to the 
NZX50 and ASX 200 index, respectively, and α will capture the out- or 
underperformance relative to the two market indices. 
 
Next, we compare each fund to a global equity portfolio and perform a global CAPM 
regression of the form, 
 
ttt RMRFR   ,    (4) 
 
where Rt is the return on a specific fund in excess of the risk-free rate (the 90-day 
bank bill rate) and RMRFt is the return on the global market portfolio (in NZ dollar) in 
excess of the risk-free rate. In this regression, β captures the exposure of the fund to 
the global market index, and α captures the out- or underperformance relative to the 
global market index.  
 
The model in Equation (4) assumes that only market risk is priced. However, in 
addition to market risk, there are other well-established factors that are known to 
affect the cross-section of stock returns, and therefore the performance of mutual 
funds. First, Banz (1981) shows that size has an important role in explaining 
differences in the cross-section of stock returns. Second, Statman (1980) and 
Rosenberg et al. (1985) show that book-to-market values have an important role in 
explaining the cross-section of stock returns. Fama and French (1992) evaluate the 
10 
 
importance of these two factors in explaining the cross-section of stock returns and 
find that, on average, small firms outperform large firms, and value stocks (firms with 
high book-to-market values) outperform growth stocks (firms with low book-to-
market values). Given that these two effects are observed persistently over time 
throughout the cross-section of stock returns, and that these are known strategies for 
generating “outperformance”, we need to control for them when assessing the 
performance of mutual funds and in this case KiwiSaver Growth funds. We therefore 
augment the CAPM with these factors and estimate the so-called Fama and French 
(1993) 3-factor model: 
 
ttttt HMLSMBRMRFR   21 ,    (5) 
 
where SMBt is the size factor constructed as a zero-investment portfolio that is long in 
small cap stocks and short in large cap stocks, and HMLt is a zero-investment 
portfolio that is long in high book-to-market stocks and short in low book-to-market 
stocks.
5
 We are again interested in the magnitude of α which captures the out- or 
underperformance of a specific fund.  
 
The final extension to the asset pricing model is the inclusion of a fourth factor, the 
momentum factor. This factor is based on the empirical results of Jegadeesh and 
Titman (1993), who find that stocks that have performed relatively well in the past, 
tend to continue to perform well in the near future, and vice versa. This phenomenon, 
known as momentum effect, has been observed consistently over time. Furthermore, 
                                                 
5
 For more details of these factors and their construction, please refer to: 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data/library.html 
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Carhart (1997) shows that the momentum factor can explain mutual fund returns 
beyond the 3-factor model proposed originally by Fama and French (1993). Carhart 
(1997) shows that, after controlling for the momentum factor, little evidence on the 
outperformance for equity mutual funds remains. Since it may be the case that the 
effect of efficiency on firm performance is driven by the momentum effect, we add 
this control variable and estimate the Carhart (1997) 4-factor model: 
 
tttttt WMLHMLSMBRMRFR   321 ,   (6) 
 
where WMLt is the return on a zero-investment momentum strategy going long in past 
winners (those firms that had the best stock price performance in the past year) and 
short in past losers.
6
  
 
2.3 Market Timing 
The last assessment we conduct on KiwiSaver Funds is whether there is any evidence 
on market timing skills of fund managers. Market timing skills would be present if 
fund managers could time the market and increase market exposure when there is an 
increase in stock prices and decrease market exposure in times when the market is 
going down. To assess market timing skills, we need to extend the one factor model to 
capture the possible non-linearity of fund portfolio and market returns. This is 
originally proposed by Treynor and Mazuy (1966). We follow their framework of by 
augmenting a CAPM regression with a squared term, i.e.,  
 
                                                 
6
Again for details of this risk-factor, please see 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data\_library.html 
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tttt RMRFRMRFR  
2 .       (6) 
 
In this equation δ captures fund managers’ market timing skills. A positive value for δ 
would indicate successful market timing skills, whereas a negative value for δ 
indicates that a manager would time the market “the wrong way around”, i.e. 
increasing market exposure when market returns are low and vice versa.  
 
3. Data 
 
We obtain monthly return data on KiwiSaver funds from Morningstar over the period 
September 2007 to April 2013. The returns are net of fees. For the same period, we 
obtain the 90-day bank bill, as a proxy for the risk-free rate, from the Reserve Bank of 
New Zealand (www.rbnz.govt.nz). Finally, we obtain data on benchmarks from 
Kenneth French’s website 
(http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data\_library.html). This 
website contains data on the global market portfolio, and the global factors on SMB, 
HML, and WML. We convert the returns on these portfolios to New Zealand Dollar.  
 
 
4. Empirical Findings  
 
In this section, we present the results for the analyses based on methodologies 
presented in Section 2. We start by assessing the replicability of KiwiSaver funds 
within a fund family. Second, we assess the performance of KiwiSaver Growth funds. 
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Finally, we test whether there is any evidence of market timing skills by mutual fund 
managers. 
 
4.1 Replicability of KiwiSaver Funds 
To assess the replicability of KiwiSaver funds within a specific fund family, we select 
all KiwiSaver funds that have Moderate or Balanced funds (moderate risk) as well as 
conservative (low risk) and growth funds (high risk). For these KiwiSaver funds, we 
examine whether it is possible to create a synthetic fund (based on a combination of 
conservative and growth funds) that tracks a balanced or moderate fund. We report 
our results for this analysis in Table 1.  
 
In the first columns of Table 1, we report the results for the constrained OLS 
regression in Equation (1), where we replicate funds based on the Conservative and 
Growth funds of a KiwiSaver fund provider; or, if available, we use the Conservative 
and Aggressive/Equity funds. The coefficients we report are essentially the weights 
that one would have to put onto the respective conservative or growth funds in order 
to replicate the fund. Within specific styles, we observe that there is quite some 
variation in weights. For instance, Grosvenor Balanced consists of a mix of 66% 
Conservative and 34% Growth, whereas Aon Balanced consists of a mix of 25% 
Conservative and 75% Growth.  
 
In the next three columns, we report the fit of the reconstructed funds. If the 
reconstructed fund fits the actual fund, we expect α = 0 and β = 1. Overall, we observe 
that this is the case for most of the funds. We further observe relatively high R
2
 values 
that are in all, except a few cases, greater than 95%. The values for the F-tests indicate 
14 
 
whether we can reject the null hypothesus that α = 0 and β = 1. In most cases, we 
observe that we cannot reject this null hypothesis, but we find significant results for 
some of the funds (e.g. the SIL and ANZ funds do not seem to be simple replications 
of a Conservative and Growth fund; Staples Balanced is not a simple mix of the other 
funds either). This can be because these funds indeed have different asset mixes (see 
e.g. Staples Balanced, which produces an α that is very different from zero, a β that is 
very different from 1; and a relatively low R
2
) or could be due to some other factors 
(see e.g. SIL Balanced, which produces a very high R
2
 and β = 1, but has a 
significantly negative α). 
 
To provide a visual representation of the fit between actual and replicated funds, we 
show the performance of $1 invested in the actual versus the replicated fund for the 
Aon Balanced fund (Panel A) and the AMP Moderate Balanced fund (Panel B). As 
can be seen from both graphs the fit between the actual fund and the replicated one 
are very close.  
 
The last column of Table 1 reports the fees of the actual fund versus the fees of the 
replicated fund (which are based on a weighted average of Conservative and Growth)
7
.  
We note that for most of the funds that we can replicate successfully (i.e. those that 
produce an insignificant F-test) the difference between actual fees and the fees on the 
reconstructed funds are negative. We find particularly large negative values for the 
AMP funds suggesting that these funds can be replicated cheaper than what they are 
                                                 
7
Note that fees should not be compared between the different KiwiSaver providers, as these funds do 
not represent the total fees charged in all cases. Fees are based on what fund providers report in their 
investment statements. Some providers only report total fees, some provide management fees, etc. 
However, the fees that we report do capture all fees that vary across the different investment styles of 
the funds.  
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offered for to investors, whereas other funds, like Aon seem to price their funds 
relatively accurately.  
 
4.2 Performance Attribution Regressions 
In this section, we assess the performance of KiwiSaver funds, by comparing them 
with various benchmarks. Here, we only focus on the Growth or Aggressive/Equity 
funds. 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
 
In Table 2, we report annual returns and standard deviation since the inception of 
these funds. We note that both returns and standard deviation show considerable 
variation among funds. Returns since inception are highest for Brook Growth at 5.91% 
p.a. and lowest for the SmartShares Growth fund at 0.01% p.a. Interestingly, we note 
that the SmartShares fund has the highest risk profile based on the standard deviation, 
whereas Brook Growth has one of the lowest standard deviations among the Growth 
funds. Hence, the traditional relationship between risk and return, i.e., higher risk-
higher return, since the inception of the KiwiSaver funds appears not to have held 
over this period. The observed negative relationship between risk and return could 
mainly be attributed to the recent Global Financial Crisis, where equities have 
performed poorly relatively to asset types, in particular fixed income assets. Based on 
the reported statistics, one can observe unusually large differences in risk, captured by 
the standard deviation. Among the growth funds, the fund with the highest risk, 
SmartShares Growth, is nearly twice as risky as Westpac Growth, being the least 
risky one. This particular finding suggests that there is a wide variation in the asset 
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allocation of the different growth funds, some tilting more heavily to equity and some 
more to fixed income assets, or possibly more to low risk versus high risk stocks. 
Investors need to be cautioned that a comparison on the basis of returns, as usually 
reported in the new papers and financial press, alone will not be very meaningful. 
  
The remaining columns in Table 2 report the results of the regression of excess fund 
returns on the excess returns of the NZX50 index and the ASX 200 index. Overall, we 
note that all of the funds in our sample exhibit significant exposures to the two market 
indices. The R
2’s of these regressions indicate how much of the variation of the funds 
can be explained by the returns on the NZX50 and the ASX 200. Here, we observe 
wide variation between these funds. For some of the funds more than 85% of their 
variation can be explained by the returns on these two market indices (ASB, Westpac, 
Onepath, ANZ, SIL and Tower), whereas other funds seems to make considerably 
different investments and yield relatively low R
2’s (Staples Rodway [58.33%], Aon 
[60.31%], and Brook [62.24], among others). Interestingly, when we consider the α’s 
of the regressions (measuring the relatively out- or under-performance), we note that 
six of the funds seem to be able to outperform (yield positive and significant α) the 
two market indices. These are Brook, Westpac, Onepath, ANZ, SIL, and Tower. We 
find no evidence for significant underperformance, as far as investing in these two 
markets are concerned.  
 
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
 
We continue our analysis by comparing the performance of each fund with the 
performance of a global market index and report the results for this regression in 
17 
 
Table 3. Our first coefficient of interest is the exposure that each fund has to the 
global market portfolio (β) as this represents the total amount of market risk in a fund. 
We note a wide variation in the total market risk with Tower Equity having the largest 
exposure (0.891) and AMP Growth having the lowest exposure (0.431), less than half 
the exposure of Tower Equity has. All other funds are dispersed relatively evenly 
between these two extremes. This finding again demonstrates the large variation in 
risk taking attitude and exposure among KiwiSaver “growth” funds. We also note the 
wide variation in the fit of this model, where R
2’s range from 22.81% (Aon) to 75.96% 
(Grosvenor), suggesting that some funds tend to have a global investment strategy, 
whereas others do not. A comparison between R
2’s of these regressions and the 
previous regression on the local market indices provides a strong indication of where 
the investment focuses of the different funds lie. Finally, when we consider the α of 
each fund, we find that in all but one case α’s are negative, and in one case we have 
weak significant evidence (Grosvenor). Our findings suggest that none of the 
KiwiSaver Growth funds systematically outperform the global benchmark.  
 
In Table 4, we report the results for the Fama and French 3-factor model, which 
augments the CAPM by including two additional factors that captures the size and the 
value effects, respectively. Based on the results reported in Table 4, we first note that 
the inclusion of these factors causes a substantial increase in the R
2’s of the 
regressions, suggesting that we make substantial improvements in terms of the fit of 
the model by including these factors. In most cases, the R
2’s of these regressions 
exceed the R
2’s of the regression based on the local market indices, suggesting that 
with the inclusion of these factors, we able to capture the same or more variation of 
fund returns than just with the two local market indices.  
18 
 
 
 
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE 
 
When we consider the factor loadings on SMB, we observe that in most cases these 
are negative, and in 13 out of 19 cases significantly so. This finding suggests that for 
the majority of funds the investment focus is more on large companies, rather than 
small companies. For the HML factor loading, we find predominantly negative 
loadings, which in 11 cases are statistically significant. This finding indicates that 
most of the funds have a significantly higher exposure to “glamour” stock (low book-
to-market values) than to value stocks. When we consider the α’s for these funds 
again, we note that in all but one case they are negative and in eight cases they are 
significantly negative. On the whole, we report that after controlling for these two 
additional risk factors, a substantial proportion of KiwiSaver growth funds 
underperform relative to these benchmarks.  
 
In Table 5, we report the results for the Carhart (1997) 4-factor model, which allows 
for an extra risk factor, the momentum. Overall, we note that the addition of the 
momentum factor does not increase the fit of the model substantially. Only in five 
cases do we observe a significant loading on the momentum factor, which is negative, 
suggesting that these funds do not employ momentum trading strategies, but rather 
show contrarian behaviour. In terms of outperformance, we observe that α’s of the 
funds remain largely negative, with some funds again having significantly negative 
α’s.  
 
19 
 
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE 
 
 
4.3 Market Timing Skills 
In Table 6, we report the results for Equation (6), which considers the market timing 
skills of KiwiSaver fund managers. In this table, we are interested in the coefficient 
on the square of the excess market return. If this coefficient is positive and significant, 
it provides evidence of positive market timing skills, i.e. fund managers increase the 
exposure to equity when returns go up, whereas a negative coefficient suggests 
negative market timing skills, i.e. fund managers increase their exposure to equity 
when equity performs poorly.  
 
INSERT TABLE 6 HERE 
 
From the results reported in Table 6, we clearly observe that there is no evidence of 
significantly positive market timing skills. For the majority of funds in our sample, we 
find that the exposure to the square of excess market returns is negative, and in six of 
the cases we observe evidence of significantly negative market timing skills. These 
significantly negative market timing skills are observed for AMP Aggressive, AMP 
Growth, OnePath and ANZ Growth, and, to a lesser extent, for Staples Rodway and 
Tower Growth.
8
 
 
 
                                                 
8
 We have also carried out analysis regarding the market timing abilities of fund managers using the 
NZX market index, in no single case there was any evidence of superior market timing. Furthermore, 
we have conducted an analysis of style timing, by including squares of the SMB and HML factor, but 
find no evidence of funds engaging in style timing. 
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5. Conclusions 
 
The KiwSaver funds and their performance have not yet been widely examined so far. 
The present study investigates some of the pertinent issues, namely, the replicability 
of KiwiSaver funds (based on their Conservative and Growth strategies) and the risk 
adjusted performance of the KiwiSaver growth funds, i.e. those with the largest 
exposure to equity investments. We also assess market timing skills of the fund 
managers. We find that for the majority of fund providers, moderate and balanced 
funds are linear combinations of the conservative and growth. Interestingly, we note 
that within the family of funds of the same provider, the replicated funds will incur 
lower fees than the actual funds, suggesting some mispricing in the calculation of fees.  
 
When we further examine the performance of KiwiSaver “Growth” funds, we find 
that there is substantial difference in the amount of risk-taking and stock market 
exposure, making it very difficult to compare these funds simply based on returns. 
Risk-adjusted performance based on commonly used performance measurement 
techniques reveals that there is no evidence of systematic outperformance of these 
funds, and in several cases we find evidence of systematic underperformance. We also 
find that none of the KiwiSaver funds in our sample exploit the well-known “size 
effect” by exposing their fund to small-cap or the “value effect”, by exposing their 
fund to value stocks. Also, none of the funds follow the well-known momentum 
strategy to generate outperformance. Finally, when we assess the market timing skills 
of KiwiSaver fund managers, we observe no evidence for significant positive market 
timing skills, and in several cases we find significant negative market timing skills.  
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Overall, our results suggest that KiwiSaver investors need to be prudent in terms of 
the selection of KiwiSaver fund provider, as these funds differ substantially in their 
degree of risk taking. Our results also suggest that there are potential shortcomings in 
the investment opportunities to KiwiSaver investors, as the KiwiSaver funds, at least 
those examined in our sample, do not offer investors with the opportunities to invest 
in small cap and value stocks.  
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Table 1.  Replication of Funds 
 Constrained OLS  Fit of Reconstructed Funds  Fees 
 
Fund 
 
Conservative 
 
Growth  
Aggressive/ 
Equity 
  
α 
 
β 
 
R2 
 
F-test 
 Fund  
Fees 
Reconstructed  
Fees 
 
Diff. 
AMP Moderate 0.73 (143.88) 0.27 (52.47)   0.012 (0.93) 1.01 (98.57) 99.34% 0.99  0.975% 0.9177% -0.05734% 
AMP Moderate 0.796 (158.23)  0.21 (43.15)  0.018 (1.08) 1.01 (81.50) 99.03% 1.01  0.975% 0.9328% -0.04225% 
AMP Moderate Balanced 0.49 (377.46) 0.51 (391.61)   0.005 (1.61) 1.00 (564.20) 99.98% 1.57  1.025% 0.9556% -0.06942% 
AMP Moderate Balanced 0.59 (223.62)  0.41 (155.49)  0.0137 (1.61) 1.00 (225.37) 99.87% 1.76  1.025% 0.9775% -0.0475% 
AMP Balanced 0.36 (66.49) 0.64 (118.06)   -0.021 (-1.51) 0.99 (161.02) 99.75% 2.68*  1.025% 0.9761% -0.04888% 
AMP Balanced 0.48 (119.40)  0.52 (127.32)  -0.011 (-0.85) 0.99 (169.95) 99.78% 0.98  1.025% 1.0050% -0.02% 
AMP Growth 0.19 (55.10)  0.81 (228.76)  0.017 (1.51) 1.00 (277.37) 99.92% 1.32  1.033% 1.0775% 0.0445% 
Aon Moderate 0.64(55.02) 0.36 (31.12)   0.038 (1.20) 0.98 (74.25) 98.82% 1.64  0.94% 0.9384% -0.0016% 
Aon Balanced 0.25 (47.39) 0.75 (140.16)   0.214 (1.50) 1.00 (230.75) 99.88% 1.30  1.01% 1.0125% 0.0025% 
ASB Moderate 0.64 (63.22) 0.36 (35.81)   -0.028 (-1.08) 0.97 (61.98) 98.34% 2.99*  0.60% 0.5080% -0.092% 
ASB Balanced 0.32 (49.19) 0.69 (107.16)   -0.022 (-1.34) 0.99 (146.57) 99.70% 1.66  0.65% 0.6110% -0.039% 
ANZ Cons. Balanced 0.75 (307.60) 0.25 (103.25)   -0.011* (-1.75) 1.00 (210.73) 99.85% 3.08*  1.02% 1.0575% 0.0375% 
ANZ Balanced 0.51 (227.02) 0.50 (222.27)   -0.014*** (-2.70) 1.00 (347.40) 99.95% 4.88**  1.07% 1.1052% 0.0352% 
ANZ Balanced Growth 0.25 (147.43) 0.75 (436.52)   -0.009** (-2.19) 1.00 (591.58) 99.98% 3.23**  1.12% 1.1325% 0.0125% 
BT Westpac Balanced 0.29 (13.09) 0.71 (32.20)   -0.0167 (-0.49) 0.97 (54.72) 97.84% 2.14  0.65% 0.6565% 0.0065% 
Fidelity Balanced 0.50 (28.81) 0.50 (29.20)   -0.0228 (-0.75) 0.99 (61.48) 98.31% 0.72  1.19% 1.1550% -0.035% 
Grosvenor Balanced 0.66 (97.63) 0.34 (51.25)   -0.017 (-0.99) 1.01 (115.64) 99.52% 0.76  1.07% 1.0380% -0.032% 
Mercer Balanced 0.41 (70.70) 0.59 (103.64)   -0.00 (-0.06) 0.99 (167.04) 99.77% 2.10  0.72% 0.6888% -0.0312% 
OnePath Cons Balanced 0.76 (175.99) 0.25 (57.05)   -0.008 (-0.78) 0.99 (117.17) 99.52% 1.03  0.60% 0.6106% 0.0106% 
OnePath Balanced 0.51 (12.62) 0.49 (12.23)   -0.016 (-0.19) 0.84 (17.95) 83.00% 6.51***  0.65% 0.6482% -0.0018% 
OnePath Balanced Growth 0.25 (132.66) 0.75 (393.00)   0.001 (0.14) 1.00 (510.10) 99.98% 0.14  0.70% 0.6950% -0.005% 
SIL Cons Balanced 0.75 (297.63) 0.26 (101.83)   -0.013** (-2.06) 1.00 (206.98) 99.85% 3.65**  1.06% 1.1096% 0.0496% 
SIL Balanced 0.51 (247.65) 0.49 (241.17)   -0.016*** (-3.34) 1.00 (386.35) 99.96% 7.01***  1.11% 1.1335% 0.0235% 
SIL Balanced Growth 0.25 (134.39) 0.75 (400.93)   -0.013*** (-2.99) 1.00 (557.98) 99.98% 5.47***  1.16% 1.1725% 0.0125% 
Staples Balanced  0.14 (2.15) 0.86 (12.78)   0.1647 (1.07) 0.71 (12.26) 69.81% 13.20***  1.05% 1.1440% 0.094% 
Tower Balanced 0.56 (25.14) 0.44 (19.40)   -0.014 (-0.30) 0.96 (42.79) 96.52% 1.43  0.98% 0.9724% -0.0076% 
Tower Balanced 0.74 (57.03)  0.26 (19.70)  -0.031 (-0.68) 0.96 (43.75) 96.67% 2.76*  0.98% 0.9450% -0.035% 
Tower Growth 0.43 (23.04)  0.57 (30.26)  -0.024 (-0.38) 0.95 (46.68) 97.06% 2.98*  1.09% 0.9997% -0.0903% 
This table reports results for the constrained OLS in Equation (1). The columns under Constrained OLS report the allocations required to replicate a specific fund. The fit of the reconstructed 
funds show the regression results for Equation (2), where we expect α = 0 and β = 1. The F-test is a test for the joint significance of α and β. Fund fees either represent total fees or total variable 
fees as they are reported by the funds in their investment statements (given that the reporting of fees is not consistent across funds, fees should not be compared between funds). Reconstructed 
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fees are the fees based on the reconstructed funds, and Diff. shows the difference between the fees on the reconstructed fund and the fund fees. T-statistics are reported in parentheses and *, 
**, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
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Table 2. Performance Relative to the NZ and Australian Stock Markets 
 
Obs 
Return 
(% p.a.) 
St. Dev.  
(% p.a.) 
α NZX 50 ASX 200 R2 
AMP Aggressive  
67 1.27% 13.08% 
0.041 
(0.19) 
0.400*** 
(3.22) 
0.308*** 
(2.95) 
59.32% 
AMP Growth 
67 1.90% 10.91% 
0.057 
(0.32) 
0.348*** 
(3.22) 
0.251*** 
(2.90) 
60.02% 
AON Growth 
67 3.96% 13.78% 
0.301 
(1.23) 
0.462*** 
(3.85) 
0.300*** 
(2.76) 
60.31% 
ASB Growth 
67 2.51% 10.94% 
0.139 
(1.22) 
0.385*** 
(7.93) 
0.333*** 
(11.17) 
87.97% 
Brook Growth 
67 5.91% 8.72% 
0.359* 
(1.86) 
0.308*** 
(4.05) 
0.182*** 
(3.85) 
62.24% 
Westpac Growth 
67 3.94% 8.06% 
0.245*** 
 (3.12) 
0.399*** 
(10.24) 
0.166*** 
(6.43) 
89.58% 
Fidelity Growth 
67 4.12% 9.12% 
0.226 
(1.60) 
0.333*** 
(3.74) 
0.209*** 
(4.36) 
69.50% 
Fidelity Aggressive 
67 3.80% 11.61% 
0.235 
(1.21) 
0.368*** 
(6.67) 
0.317*** 
(8.90) 
72.23% 
Fisher Growth 
67 5.34% 12.80% 
0.372 
(1.56) 
0.366*** 
(4.68) 
0.396*** 
(5.06) 
75.79% 
Forsyth Barr Growth  
58 2.36% 8.76% 
-0.114 
(-1.04) 
0.329*** 
(6.88) 
0.275*** 
(4.79) 
84.23% 
Grosvenor High Growth  
67 0.62% 11.94% 
0.000 
(0.00) 
0.414*** 
(5.58) 
0.343*** 
(7.60) 
82.60% 
Mercer High Growth 
67 1.60% 12.55% 
0.106 
(0.65) 
0.454*** 
(10.54) 
0.354*** 
(6.56) 
83.30% 
OnePath growth 
67 3.03% 9.64% 
0.208** 
(2.36) 
0.453*** 
(13.61) 
0.222*** 
(9.28) 
91.27% 
ANZ Growth 
67 4.21% 10.38% 
0.312*** 
(3.18) 
0.458*** 
(9.94) 
0.255*** 
(8.24) 
89.45% 
SIL Growth 
67 4.38% 10.37% 
0.327*** 
(3.35) 
0.459*** 
(9.96) 
0.253*** 
(7.91) 
89.35% 
Smart Growth 
67 0.01% 15.58% 
0.122 
(0.69) 
0.725*** 
(10.40) 
0.279*** 
(4.42) 
77.47% 
Staples Rodway Growth 
66 4.29% 9.20% 
0.212 
(1.45) 
0.247*** 
(2.71) 
0.236*** 
(2.94) 
58.33% 
TOWER Growth 
67 2.93% 10.88% 
0.211* 
(1.84) 
0.463*** 
(9.46) 
0.263*** 
(6.09) 
85.24% 
TOWER Equity 
67 0.44% 15.68% 
0.032 
(0.16) 
0.462*** 
(5.84) 
0.509*** 
(8.16) 
81.13% 
This table reports average return and risk (standard deviation) over the sample period. We also report 
the regression results for a model that includes the NZX50 and the ASX200 as benchmarks.  Obs. is the 
number of observations Return and St. Dev. are the annual average return and standard deviation, 
respectively, α measures the risk-adjusted performance relative to the benchmarks, NZX50 and ASX200 
show the coefficients on the on the excess return on the NZX50 and ASX200, and R
2
 measures the 
goodness of fit. Newey-West corrected t-statistics are reported in parentheses and *, **, and *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
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Table 3. Performance measurement using the CAPM 
 
 
Obs. α RMRF R2 
AMP Aggressive  
67 
-0.309 
(-0.77) 
0.504*** 
(3.95) 
25.60% 
AMP Growth 
67 
-0.243 
(-0.72) 
0.431*** 
(4.10) 
26.69% 
AON Growth 
67 
-0.083 
(-0.17) 
0.502*** 
(4.38) 
22.81% 
ASB Growth 
67 
-0.232 
(-0.85) 
0.680*** 
(9.91) 
65.72% 
Brook Growth 
67 
0.078 
(0.35) 
0.512*** 
(5.82) 
60.15% 
Westpac Growth 
67 
-0.088 
(-0.45) 
0.521*** 
(12.21) 
70.07% 
Fidelity Growth 
67 
-0.085 
(-0.53) 
0.594*** 
(8.45) 
73.32% 
Fidelity Aggressive 
67 
-0.132 
(-0.51) 
0.734*** 
(11.48) 
69.14% 
Fisher Growth 
67 
-0.002 
(-0.01) 
0.728*** 
(6.35) 
55.52% 
Forsyth Barr Growth  
58 
-0.270 
(-0.84) 
0.457*** 
(4.92) 
43.48% 
Grosvenor High Growth  
67 
-0.406* 
(-1.82) 
0.792*** 
(11.32) 
75.96% 
Mercer High Growth 
67 
-0.298 
(-0.72) 
0.623*** 
(5.90) 
42.00% 
OnePath Growth 
67 
-0.171 
(-0.63) 
0.566*** 
(7.61) 
58.01% 
ANZ Growth 
67 
-0.082 
(-0.29) 
0.623*** 
(9.40) 
60.92% 
SIL Growth 
67 
-0.067 
(-0.24) 
0.621*** 
(9.39) 
60.70% 
Smart Growth 
67 
-0.446 
(-0.94) 
0.717*** 
(5.67) 
36.51% 
Staples Rodway Growth 
66 
-0.034 
(-0.13) 
0.449*** 
(5.68) 
41.29% 
TOWER Growth 
67 
-0.186 
(-0.61) 
0.613*** 
(7.76) 
54.00% 
TOWER Equity 
67 
-0.437 
(-1.18) 
0.891*** 
(7.86) 
55.91% 
This table reports regression results for Equation (4). The benchmark (RMRF) is the global market 
portfolio obtained from Kenneth French’s website. Obs. is the number of observations, α measures the 
risk-adjusted performance relative to the benchmark, RMRF is the excess return on the global market 
portfolio and R
2
 measures the goodness of fit. Newey-West corrected t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses and *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4. Performance measurement using the Fama and French (1993) 3-Factor 
Model 
 
Obs. α RMRF SMB HML R2 
AMP Aggressive  
67 
-0.381* 
(-1.81) 
0.634*** 
(8.25) 
-0.118 
(-1.47) 
-0.408*** 
(-3.80) 
67.23% 
AMP Growth 
67 
-0.302* 
(-1.67) 
0.537*** 
(8.37) 
-0.099 
(-1.43) 
-0.333*** 
(-3.65) 
66.82% 
AON Growth 
67 
-0.154 
(-0.67) 
0.633*** 
(8.40) 
-0.212*** 
(-2.66) 
-0.366*** 
(-2.92) 
67.71% 
ASB Growth 
67 
-0.258** 
(-2.07) 
0.737*** 
(21.29) 
-0.258*** 
(-5.25) 
-0.078 
(-1.50) 
90.26% 
Brook Growth 
67 
0.081 
(0.40) 
0.515*** 
(5.37) 
-0.180 
(-1.47) 
0.077 
(0.64) 
65.66% 
Westpac Growth 
67 
-0.107 
(-0.80) 
0.560*** 
(19.96) 
-0.122*** 
(-3.12) 
-0.076* 
(-1.73) 
85.14% 
Fidelity Growth 
67 
-0.089 
(-0.81) 
0.611*** 
(7.96) 
-0.206*** 
(-3.37) 
0.041 
(0.65) 
83.31% 
Fidelity Aggressive 
67 
-0.155 
(-0.93) 
0.783*** 
(16.62) 
-0.169*** 
(-2.86) 
-0.090 
(-1.61) 
82.01% 
Fisher Growth 
67 
-0.061 
(-0.21) 
0.827*** 
(9.25) 
0.045 
(0.54) 
-0.377*** 
(-3.39) 
74.21% 
Forsyth Barr Growth  
58 
-0.326* 
(-1.75) 
0.551*** 
(7.35) 
-0.048 
(-0.62) 
-0.239* 
(-1.89) 
74.17% 
Grosvenor High Growth  
67 
-0.423*** 
(-3.74) 
0.834*** 
(19.72) 
-0.252*** 
(-2.67) 
-0.027 
(-0.39) 
90.78% 
Mercer High Growth 
67 
-0.349* 
(-1.87) 
0.724*** 
(12.84) 
-0.285*** 
(-5.06) 
-0.222** 
(-2.63) 
83.42% 
OnePath Growth 
67 
-0.196 
(-1.30) 
0.621*** 
(14.65) 
-0.226*** 
(-4.70) 
-0.084 
(-1.44) 
84.25% 
ANZ Growth 
67 
-0.111 
(-0.68) 
0.683*** 
(18.52) 
-0.222*** 
(-4.98) 
-0.104** 
(-1.98) 
86.09% 
SIL Growth 
67 
-0.095 
(-0.59) 
0.681*** 
(18.61) 
-0.226*** 
(-5.00) 
-0.101* 
(-1.91) 
86.01% 
Smart Growth 
67 
-0.488* 
(-1.76) 
0.811*** 
(14.09) 
-0.463*** 
(-4.51) 
-0.109 
(-1.00) 
72.26% 
Staples Rodway Growth 
66 
-0.054 
(-0.31) 
0.511*** 
(5.59) 
-0.085 
(-0.77) 
-0.176 
(-1.13) 
61.79% 
TOWER Growth 
67 
-0.233 
(-1.49) 
0.701*** 
(15.11) 
-0.132** 
(-2.39) 
-0.248*** 
(-3.55) 
84.77% 
TOWER Equity 
67 
-0.509*** 
(-2.86) 
1.024*** 
(21.19) 
-0.156** 
(-2.03) 
-0.398*** 
(-4.62) 
88.07% 
This table reports regression results for Equation (5), where the CAPM is augmented with the global 
SMB and HML factors from Kenneth French’s website. Obs. is the number of observations, α measures 
the risk-adjusted performance relative to the benchmark, RMRF is the excess return on the global 
market portfolio, SMB is the global size factor, HML is the global value factor, and R
2
 measures the 
goodness of fit. Newey-West corrected t-statistics are reported in parentheses and *, **, and *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 5. Performance measurement using the Carhart (1997) 4-Factor Model 
 
Obs α RMRF SMB HML WML R2 
AMP Aggressive  
67 
-0.381* 
(-1.78) 
0.635*** 
(9.47) 
-0.119 
(-1.10) 
-0.408*** 
(-3.73)  
0.001 
(0.01) 
67.23% 
AMP Growth 
67 
-0.302* 
(-1.65) 
0.538*** 
(9.65) 
-0.099 
(-1.08) 
-0.333*** 
(-3.58) 
0.000 
(0.01) 
66.82% 
AON Growth 
67 
-0.136 
(-0.59) 
0.596*** 
(8.41) 
-0.107 
(-0.90) 
-0.343*** 
(-2.87) 
-0.100 
(-1.16) 
68.99% 
ASB Growth 
67 
-0.249* 
(-1.96) 
0.719*** 
(22.03) 
-0.205*** 
(-3.87) 
-0.067 
(-1.27) 
-0.050 
(-1.58) 
90.76% 
Brook Growth 
67 
0.083 
(0.39) 
0.512*** 
(4.85) 
-0.171 
(-1.43) 
0.079 
(0.64) 
-0.009 
(-0.17) 
65.69% 
Westpac Growth 
67 
-0.106 
(-0.78) 
0.557*** 
(17.59) 
-0.115** 
(-2.59) 
-0.074* 
(-1.70) 
-0.007 
(-0.24) 
85.16% 
Fidelity Growth 
67 
-0.074 
(-0.63) 
0.579*** 
(8.90) 
-0.115** 
(-2.05) 
0.061 
(1.04) 
-0.087*** 
(-3.30) 
85.51% 
Fidelity Aggressive 
67 
-0.144 
(-0.90) 
0.759*** 
(15.30) 
-0.102 
(-1.45) 
-0.075 
(-1.44) 
-0.063** 
(-2.22) 
82.74% 
Fisher Growth 
67 
-0.023 
(-0.10) 
0.746*** 
(9.28) 
0.275*** 
(3.45) 
-0.326*** 
(-3.02) 
-0.219*** 
(-6.98) 
81.33% 
Forsyth Barr Growth  
58 
-0.327* 
(-1.71) 
0.537*** 
(7.16) 
-0.021 
(-0.24) 
-0.227* 
(-1.83) 
-0.030 
(-0.72) 
74.47% 
Grosvenor High Growth  
67 
-0.412*** 
(-3.92) 
0.812*** 
(16.50) 
-0.187* 
(-1.93) 
-0.013 
(-0.17) 
-0.061*** 
(-2.15) 
91.43% 
Mercer High Growth 
67 
-0.330* 
(-1.78) 
0.683*** 
(12.54) 
-0.167** 
(-2.18) 
-0.196** 
(-2.36) 
-0.113*** 
(-2.04) 
85.38% 
OnePath Growth 
67 
-0.194 
(-1.26) 
0.616*** 
(13.28) 
-0.211*** 
(-3.70) 
-0.080 
(-1.32) 
-0.014 
(-0.32) 
84.30% 
ANZ Growth 
67 
-0.106 
(-0.63) 
0.672*** 
(17.18) 
-0.192*** 
(-3.32) 
-0.098* 
(-1.88) 
-0.029 
(-0.58) 
86.27% 
SIL Growth 
67 
-0.090 
(-0.55) 
0.670*** 
(17.19) 
-0.195*** 
(-3.38) 
-0.094* 
(-1.81) 
-0.029 
(-0.58) 
86.19% 
Smart Growth 
67 
-0.478* 
(-1.72) 
0.791*** 
(14.12) 
-0.406*** 
(-3.36) 
-0.096 
(-0.92) 
-0.054 
(-0.77) 
72.56% 
Staples Rodway Growth 
66 
-0.047 
(-0.27) 
0.490*** 
(5.65) 
-0.028 
(-0.22) 
-0.161 
(-1.07) 
-0.056 
(-0.90) 
62.68% 
TOWER Growth 
67 
-0.222 
(-1.35) 
0.678*** 
(15.03) 
-0.068 
(-1.11) 
-0.234*** 
(-3.39) 
-0.061 
(-1.37) 
85.54% 
TOWER Equity 
67 
-0.500** 
(-2.68) 
1.005*** 
(20.92) 
-0.103 
(-1.24) 
-0.386*** 
(-4.44) 
-0.051 
(-1.00) 
88.32% 
This table reports regression results for Equation (6), where the CAPM is augmented with the global 
SMB, HML and WML factors from Kenneth French’s website. Obs. is the number of observations, α 
measures the risk-adjusted performance relative to the benchmark, RMRF is the excess return on the 
global market portfolio, SMB is the global size factor, HML is the global value factor, WML is the 
global momentum factors and R
2
 measures the goodness of fit. Newey-West corrected t-statistics are 
reported in parentheses and *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 6. Market Timing Skills 
 
 
Obs α RMRF RMRF2 R2 
AMP Aggressive  
67 
0.066 
(0.15) 
0.510*** 
(4.73) 
-0.026*** 
(-2.64) 
28.18% 
AMP Growth 
67 
0.062 
(0.18) 
0.435*** 
(4.90) 
-0.021** 
(-2.57) 
29.14% 
AON Growth 
67 
0.129 
(0.27) 
0.505*** 
(4.64) 
-0.015 
(-1.45) 
23.56% 
ASB Growth 
67 
-0.125 
(-0.51) 
0.681*** 
(9.91) 
-0.007 
(-0.84) 
66.02% 
Brook Growth 
67 
-0.079 
(-0.36) 
0.509*** 
(5.71) 
0.011 
(0.66) 
61.19% 
Westpac Growth 
67 
0.019 
(0.09) 
0.523*** 
(12.57) 
-0.007 
(-1.50) 
70.62% 
Fidelity Growth 
67 
-0.245 
(-1.52) 
0.591*** 
(9.87) 
0.011 
(1.08) 
74.29% 
Fidelity Aggressive 
67 
-0.221 
(-0.88) 
0.733*** 
(11.38) 
0.006 
(0.93) 
69.33% 
Fisher Growth 
67 
-0.135 
(-0.40) 
0.726*** 
(6.18) 
0.009 
(0.50) 
55.85% 
Forsyth Barr Growth  
58 
-0.131 
(-0.49) 
0.470*** 
(4.69) 
-0.010 
(-0.91) 
44.34% 
Grosvenor High Growth  
67 
-0.251 
(-1.45) 
0.794*** 
(11.62) 
-0.011 
(-1.06) 
76.49% 
Mercer High Growth 
67 
-0.097 
(-0.26) 
0.626*** 
(6.05) 
-0.014 
(-1.17) 
42.80% 
OnePath Growth 
67 
0.132 
(0.48) 
0.626*** 
(10.10) 
-0.015** 
(-2.19) 
62.24% 
ANZ Growth 
67 
0.145 
(0.53) 
0.624*** 
(10.13) 
-0.015** 
(-2.20) 
62.00% 
SIL Growth 
67 
-0.284 
(-0.54) 
0.719*** 
(5.82) 
-0.011 
(-0.90) 
36.85% 
Smart Growth 
66 
-0.041 
(-0.15) 
0.449 
(5.55) 
0.000 
(0.04) 
41.29% 
Staples Rodway Growth 
67 
0.045 
(0.16) 
0.617 
(8.00) 
-0.016* 
(-1.81) 
55.40% 
TOWER Growth 
67 
-0.115 
(-0.35) 
0.896 
(8.27) 
-0.022* 
(-1.84) 
57.25% 
This table reports regression results for the market timing model in Equation (7). The benchmark 
(RMRF) is the global market portfolio obtained from Kenneth French’s website. Obs. is the number of 
observations, RMRF is the excess return on the global market portfolio, RMRF
2
 measures market 
timing skills and R
2
 measures the goodness of fit. Newey-West corrected t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses and *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Figure 1 
Panel A – Replication of the Aon Balanced fund 
  
 
Panel B – Replication of the AMP Moderate Balanced fund 
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